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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ricardo Ozuna Jr. appeals from his conviction and sentence for lewd 
conduct with a minor following a jury trial. Specifically, Ozuna challenges the 
district court's denial of Ozuna's attempts to elicit testimony that his 15-year old 
victim had Chlamydia at the time he engaged in sexual contact with her and he 
asserts the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ozuna met then 15-year old E.B. and her friend AB. through Live Links. 
(JT Tr., p.286, L.11 - p.287, L.25.) Ozuna picked the two minor girls up and took 
them to the house he shared with his father where he provided E.B. with alcohol. 
(JT Tr., p.289, L.13 - p.296, L.6.) E.B. became intoxicated to the point she 
"couldn't even walk straight." (JT Tr., p.296, L.19.) E.B. blacked out for a while 
and when she regained consciousness, Ozuna was lying on top of her and she 
felt him withdraw his penis from her vagina. (JT Tr., p.301, L.22 - p.303, L.9.) 
When Ozuna gave E.B. a ride to a convenience store down the street from her 
house later that morning, he thanked E.B. for having sex with him twice the 
previous night. (JT Tr., p.306, L.19 - p.308, L.2.) 
A grand jury indicted Ozuna for lewd conduct with a minor under 16 for 
having genital to genital contact with E.B. (R., pp.36-37.) The state later filed an 
amended superceding indictment adding a sentencing enhancement pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 19-2520G (2) for Ozuna's prior conviction for lewd conduct. 
(R., pp.67-68.) Ozuna pied not guilty and the matter proceeded to jury trial. 
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After the jury was selected for his trial, Ozuna made an oral motion 
seeking to introduce evidence that E.B. had chlamydia at the time of the sexual 
contact with Ozuna by asking E.B. "whether or not she had a sexually 
transmittable disease at the time she allege[d] that she had sexual relations with 
Mr. Ozuna" and by eliciting hearsay testimony from Ozuna that he did not have 
any desire to have sex with E.B. because AB. had informed Ozuna that E.B. had 
chlamydia. (JT Tr., p.229, L.8 - p.230, L.5.) Ozuna also wished to testify that at 
the time of trial, he [did] not suffer from a sexually transmitted disease. He [did] 
not suffer from chlamydia, and never came down with any signs." (JT Tr., p.230, 
Ls.7-12.) 
The trial court denied Ozuna's motion, finding the evidence was 
inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 412. (JT Tr., p.243, Ls.17-21.) The 
court further found the proffered evidence was not "constitutionally required to be 
admitted" and that "the probative value of the evidence outweigh[ed] the danger 
of unfair prejudice." (JT Tr., p.245, Ls.3-6.) 
The matter continued to trial with the jury returning a verdict of guilty to 
lewd conduct with a minor. (JT Tr., p.695, Ls.11-25; R., p.173.) Following the 
verdict and the presentation of evidence on the part 11 of the amended 
superceding indictment, the jury also found that Ozuna had been previously 
convicted of lewd conduct with a minor in support of the sentencing 
enhancement. (JT Tr., p.722, Ls.14-22; R., p.174.) 
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The court sentenced Ozuna to a unified life sentence with the first 20 
years fixed. (6/21/12 Tr., p.48, Ls.11-18; R., pp.225-226.) Ozuna timely 
appeals. (R., pp.227-231.) 
3 
ISSUES 
Ozuna states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in concluding that the proffered 
evidence fell under Idaho Rule of Evidence 412, and violate Mr. 
Ozuna's constitutional rights to present a defense and a fair trial, 
when it prevented him from testifying that he did not have sexual 
intercourse with the alleged victim because he had been told that 
she had chlamydia? 
2. Did the district court err in concluding that the proffered 
evidence fell under Idaho Rule of Evidence 412, and violate Mr. 
Ozuna's constitutional rights to present a defense and a fair trial, 
when it prevented him from eliciting testimony that the alleged 
victim had chlamydia at the time of the alleged assault and that he 
had shown no signs of chlamydia since the alleged assault? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
life sentence, with twenty years fixed, following Mr. Ozuna's 
conviction for lewd conduct with a sentencing enhancement? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 9.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Ozuna failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to 
elicit testimony of the victim's past sexual behavior? 





Ozuna Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It 
Denied Ozuna's Motion To Introduce Evidence Of His Victim's Previous Sexual 
Behavior 
A. Introduction 
Ozuna asserts that the district court erred when it prevented him from 
testifying that he "did not have sexual intercourse with E.B. because he had been 
told that she had chlamydia," and from presenting evidence that his victim did 
have chlamydia "at the time of the alleged assault, and that he did not contract 
chlamydia following the alleged assault." (Appellant's brief, pp.4, 16.) Ozuna's 
claim fails, however, because the district court correctly determined the proffered 
evidence was impermissible evidence of a victim's previous sexual behavior and 
was not constitutionally required. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). 
Questions of relevancy, however, are reviewed de novo. State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 
P.2d 596 (1993). 
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C. Ozuna Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion Because The 
Proposed Evidence Was Not Admissible 
Admission of evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior is controlled by 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 412. That rule provides that "evidence of a victim's past 
sexual behavior" is not admissible unless the defendant (1) complies with the 
procedures of the rule and (2) admission of the evidence is "constitutionally 
required." I.RE. 412 (b). The procedural prerequisite to admissibility was 
recently set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
The admissibility of I.RE. 412 evidence is determined solely 
from the basis of the l.R.E. 412 hearing. See I.RE. 412 (c)(2)-(3). 
Under I.RE. 412, evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior is 
generally inadmissible. l.R.E. 412 (a)-(b). A defendant seeking to 
introduce evidence regarding a sex-crime victim's past sexual 
behavior is required to submit a written offer of proof from which the 
trial court determines if that evidence falls within the limited 
exceptions for admissibility. I.RE. 412 (c)(2). In other words, the 
trial court determines whether it will even consider the admissibility 
of the evidence based upon the written offer of proof. If the trial 
court determines that an l.R.E. 412 hearing is warranted, the 
evidence's admissibility is determined from the basis of that hearing 
alone. l.R.E. 412 (c)(3). 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 216, 245 P.3d 961, 968 (2010). Because the 
court found that Ozuna did not receive "the evidence confirming that [the victim] 
had chlamydia" until the weekend before the trial was to begin, it found Ozuna's 
motion was not untimely nor that Ozuna "failed to comply with that aspect of the 
rule." (JT Tr., p.242, L.22 - p.243, L.3.) Finding Ozuna's motion was not 
procedurally barred, the trial court analyzed it pursuant to I.RE. 412 despite 
Ozuna's claim that the rule did not apply to this particular set of circumstances. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has articulated the constitutional standard of 
I.RE. 412 (b) as a two-prong test of, first, "whether the evidence proffered is 
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relevant" and second, if so, "whether other legitimate interests outweigh the 
defendant's interest in presenting the evidence." State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 
236, 241, 220 P.3d 1055, 1060 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting State v. Self, 139 Idaho 
718, 722, 85 P.3d 1117, 1121 (Ct. App. 2003)). Thus, to show error, Ozuna must 
demonstrate that he presented to the district court an offer of proof that 
established both that the proposed evidence was relevant and that its relevance 
was not outweighed by other legitimate interests. 
The morning of trial, the district court addressed the issue of "whether or 
not defense should be able to address the issue of diagnosis or health diagnosis 
regarding the alleged victim of the case." (JT Tr., p.229, Ls.8-12.) Ozuna 
advised the court that the "first thing [he] want[ed] to do" was to ask E.B. 
"whether or not she had a sexually transmittable disease at the time she allege[d] 
that she had sexual relations with Mr. Ozuna." (JT Tr., p.229, Ls.18-21.) Ozuna 
indicated he then wanted to be able to testify at his trial not only does he "not 
[now] suffer from a sexually transmitted disease," he "was not interested in 
having sexual relations with [E.B.]" because a third party had told Ozuna that 
E.B. had chlamydia. (JT Tr., p.229, L.22 - p.230, L.5.) Ozuna's offer of proof for 
his position was: 
when Mr. Ozuna testifies, he would testify, I'll make an offer of 
proof, that [AB.], the other woman present, had told him that [E.B.] 
had a sexually transmitted disease. 
On the first case, Judge, the fact that she had a sexually 
transmitted disease, Mr. Ozuna would further testify that he has 
sinqe been to a doctor, had, basically, a full physical, and he does 
not suffer from a sexually transmitted disease. He does not suffer 
from chlamydia, and never came down with any signs. 
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(JT Tr., p.229, L.23 - p.230, L.12.) 
Contrary to Ozuna's assertion that the evidence was being offered to 
show his state of mind at the time he was around E.B., thus proving why he did 
not want to have sex with her (see JT Tr., p.246, L.16 - p.248, L.9), at best it was 
evidence of a prior sexual act used merely to paint the victim as a person of 
questionable moral character who had contracted a sexually transmitted 
disease-the very thing prohibited by Rule 412. The district court pointed out 
that contrary to Ozuna's assertion, asking his victim if she had a sexually 
transmitted disease "would certainly be an inquiry about the truth of the 
allegation." (JT Tr., p.255, Ls.7-12.) The court found that "giving the jury the 
impression that the alleged victim was promiscuous, having sex with people" was 
not outweighed by the probative value of such evidence. (JT Tr., p.248, Ls.10-
15.) The district court properly held that Ozuna had failed to demonstrate that he 
was entitled to admission of the evidence under the constitutional right exception 
to the rule. (JT Tr., p.245, Ls.2-6.) 
Ozuna asserted below and asserts on appeal that the evidence he was 
seeking to introduce at trial did not fall under I. R. E. 412 because he was not 
introducing it for the truth of the matter asserted. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-10.) 
His own position at the hearing on his oral motion belies this point. He advised 
the court that the first thing he wanted to be able to do was ask the victim if she 
in fact had chlamydia at the time Ozuna had sexual contact with her. (See, JT 
Tr., p.229, Ls.17-21.) Ozuna indicated he would then follow up with his own 
testimony that he had "basically, a full physical" and never "came down with any 
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signs" of chlamydia. (JT Tr., p.230, Ls.1-12.) Asking a victim of a sexual offense 
if she had a sexually transmitted disease contracted prior to her being sexually 
active with a defendant is by its very nature asking about prior sexual behavior of 
the victim. The district court agreed, finding "the suggested evidence is evidence 
of a victim's past behavior, suggesting that she had past sexual activities." (JT 
Tr., p.243, Ls.17-21.) 
Ozuna argues that his attempt to testify at trial as to A.B.'s statement to 
him that E.B. had chlamydia was not covered by I.RE. 412 because it was not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted but to show why he was not interested 
in having sexual contact with E.B. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-10.) However, the 
only evidence of this conversation is the uncorroborated word of Ozuna himself. 
If the Court were to determine such hearsay evidence was not covered by I.RE. 
412, the trial court correctly determined that the probative value of such 
evidence did not outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. (See JT Tr., p.244, 
L.22 - p.245, L.248, L.15.) 
Because the Idaho appellate courts have not directly addressed this issue, 
Ozuna cites to Reece v. State, 383 S.E.2d 572, 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989), for his 
position that evidence of a victim's contracting a sexually transmitted disease is 
not evidence of the kind of prior sexual behavior sought to be excluded by l.R.E. 
412. (See Appellant's brief, pp.7-10.) Reece is a case that involved the state 
attempting to show that a victim contracted a sexually transmitted disease from 
the defendant and the defendant objecting to the trial court's refusal to allow him 
to counter that with evidence that he did not in fact have a disease to sexually 
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transmit and was therefore not the one responsible for committing the sexual 
offense he had been accused of. 383 S.E.2d at 574. 
Reece is distinguishable from the present case wherein Ozuna is 
attempting to introduce evidence that his victim had a sexually transmitted 
disease which she contracted prior to his meeting her in order to show that since 
he did not contract a sexually transmitted disease from his victim, he did not have 
sexual contact with her. However, Ozuna's offer of proof that he had 
subsequently been tested by a doctor does not establish that he was not infected 
after the sexual contact occurred nor does it rule out the possibility that Ozuna 
had sexual contact with E.B. Ozuna has failed to establish the district court 
erred by analyzing the evidence proffered under l.R.E. 412 and concluding it was 
inadmissible. 
Finally, even if it was error for the district court to exclude evidence that 
his victim had tested positive for chlamydia prior to his contact with her and 
Ozuna's own self-reported negative chlamydia status at the time of trial, any error 
was harmless. In State v. Pena-Rojas, 822 A.2d 921 (R.I. 2003), the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court found the failure of the trial court to exclude evidence that 
the defendant was "free of any sexually transmitted diseases" where there was 
evidence that the victim had sexual contact with another man on the same 
evening he was alleged to have had sexual contact with her was harmless error 
based on the other evidence presented at trial: 
Most importantly, other evidence implicated defendant as the 
person who had sexual relations with the victim on the date in 
question, including the victim's testimony, her identification of the 
location of the motel where the assault too place, her identification 
10 
of defendant from a police-assembled photographic array, and the 
physical evidence of motel records identifying defendant as the 
person who rented the motel room. Thus, if it was error for the trial 
justice to exclude evidence that defendant was free of any sexually 
transmitted diseases, it was harmless error. 
822 A.2d at 924. 
In this case, any error in the exclusion of evidence was harmless in light of 
the overwhelming evidence implicating Ozuna as E.B.'s offender. '"Where error 
concerns evidence omitted at trial, the test [for harmless error] is whether there is 
a reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded evidence might have 
contributed to the conviction."' State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 84 7, 979 P .2d 
1201, 1205 (1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207, 209, 804 P.2d 
936, 938 (Ct. App. 1991 )). 
Here, E.B. identified Ozuna from a photo-lineup conducted at the 
beginning of the investigation. (JT Tr., p.312, L.23 - p.315, L.1.) Ozuna 
ultimately admitted to having been with E.B. on the evening in question and 
although he initially denied having any sexual contact with E.B., Ozuna testified 
at trial that he woke up to E.B. "straddling" him while he was wearing only his 
"boxers and a tank top." (JT Tr., p.608, Ls.1-14.) Most importantly, however, as 
evidence presented implicating Ozuna as the person who had sexual contact 
with the 15-year old E.B. were the results of a DNA analysis taken from a swab 
taken from E.B. after Ozuna had sexual contact with her. The results of that 
analysis were that it was "137 quadrillion times more likely" that the swab taken 
from E.B. was "a result of the combination of [E.B.'s] DNA and Mr. Ozuna's DNA 
than if it had been a combination of [E.B.'s] DNA and an unrelated person 
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randomly selected from the general population." (JT Tr., p.547, Ls.16-24.) If it 
was error to exclude the evidence proffered by Ozuna the morning of trial, any 
error was harmless. 
II. 
Ozuna Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Ozuna argues the district court abused its discretion by failing to give 
sufficient consideration to the mitigating factors presented to it at Ozuna's 
sentencing hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp.24-26.) Ozuna has failed to meet his 
burden and has thereby failed to establish that the district court abused its 
discretion in imposing a unified life sentence with the first 20 years fixed upon a 
jury finding of guilty to lewd conduct with a sentencing enhancement for having a 
previous conviction for lewd conduct. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal, the appellate 
court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the case" and 
considers the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v. 
Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2006). To prevail, the 
appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the 
sentence is excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment. Cope, 
142 Idaho at 500, 129 P.3d at 1249. Those objectives are "(1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the 
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possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." 
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). The fixed portion 
of the sentence is considered the probable duration of confinement. State v. 
Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. App. 1989). A sentence 
that does not exceed the statutory maximum will not be disturbed on appeal 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 
P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). Where reasonable minds might differ as to the 
length of sentence, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the 
sentencing court. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 
(1992). 
C. Ozuna Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion 
Ozuna asserts on appeal "that, given any view of the facts, his life 
sentence, with twenty years fixed, is excessive." (Appellant's brief, p.24.) 
Specifically, Ozuna contends that his family support and substance abuse were 
"mitigating factors known to the district court at the time of sentencing, [and] the 
district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified life sentence, with 
twenty years fixed." (Appellant's brief, p.26.) 
The court considered mitigating factors before sentencing Ozuna, 
including his family support: "In mitigation Mr. Ozuna in the relationship with his 
family and circumstances outside of his predatory sexual behavior appears to 
care about his family, children, has done some positive things in his lifetime." 
(6/21/12 Tr., p.46, Ls.17-21.) Ozuna's "history of substance and alcohol abuse" 
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was also before the court at sentencing. (PSI, p.11.) The court considered 
Ozuna's "substance abuse issues" but weighed them against the opportunities 
had been given and failed "each time" he was on probation or parole. (6/21/12 
Tr., p.45, L.11 - p.46, L.2.) 
The aggravation considered by the court far outweighed the mitigation 
presented at sentencing. The court found "the nature of the offense" itself 
aggravating, especially where Ozuna was "already subject to registration 
requirements as a sexual predator." (6/21/12 Tr., p.43, Ls.16-22.) The court 
noted Ozuna continued to deny culpability for his actions and instead attempted 
to place the blame on his victim at sentencing: "Mr. Ozuna, I'm a little - I'm a lot 
disappointed that you continually attempt to besmirch the victim in this case by 
making reference to things that may insult her character." (6/21/12 Tr., p.43, 
L.23 - p.44, L.1.) 
The court found Ozuna was a "predator" based on the similarities in 
Ozuna's behavior leading to his two lewd conduct convictions, his commission of 
the latest while on his third opportunity on parole, and the use of alcohol in the 
abuse of his victims. (6/21/12 Tr., p.44, Ls.14-23.) Those concerns, coupled 
with Ozuna's dishonesty in the investigation and his repeated failed opportunities 
at rehabilitation led the court to the conclusion that Ozuna "pose[d] a threat to ... 
potential victims of sexual abuse." (6/21/12 Tr., p.46, Ls.5-6.) 
Ozuna has failed to show that the sentence of twenty years fixed followed 
by an indeterminate life is excessive considering the seriousness of his repeat 
offense and the impact upon his victim and potential victims when viewed with 
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Ozuna's many previous failed attempts at rehabilitation and his continued failure 
to take any responsibility or exhibit any remorse for his actions. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to uphold Ozuna's judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
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